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11 Introduction
We consider the problem of allocating inﬁnitely divisible commodities among a
group of agents. We assume that each agent has continuous, strictly convex, and
“separable” preference. A preference is separable if the preference over consumption
of each commodity is not aﬀected by the consumption levels of the other commodi-
ties. A rule is a function which chooses a feasible allocation for each preference
proﬁle.
Preferences are usually private information. Agents may strategically misrep-
resent their preferences to obtain assignments they prefer. As a result, the chosen
allocations may not be socially desirable relative to the agents’ true preferences.
Thus, it is important for a rule to give agents the incentive to represent their pref-
erences truthfully. The condition is called strategy-proofness.1 Our purpose is to
identify the class of strategy-proof rules which yield socially desirable allocations.
In the one-commodity case, it is well-known that the so-called “uniform rule” is
strategy-proof. For this rule, agents are allowed to choose their consumption sub-
ject to a common upper or lower bound, which is chosen so as to attain feasibility.
In this article, we characterize a multiple-commodity version of the uniform rule by
strategy-proofness and the following three axioms. First is unanimity, a weak con-
dition of eﬃciency. It says that if the sum of the peak amounts of each commodity
is equal to the supply of the commodity, then each agent’s assignment should be
equal to his own peak vector. Second is symmetry, a weak condition of fairness. It
says that two agents with the same preferences should receive assignments between
which they are indiﬀerent. Third is nonbossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein,
1981). It says that when an agent’s preferences change, if his assignment remains
the same, then the chosen allocation should remain the same. We establish that on
the class of continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences, a rule satisﬁes
strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness if and only if it is the
uniform rule. This result extends to the class of continuous, strictly convex, and
“multidimensional single-peaked”preferences.2
Sprumont (1991) gave the ﬁrst axiomatic characterization of the uniform rule,
a rule introduced by Benassy (1982) in a general equilibrium model with ﬁxed
prices. For the one-commodity case, he showed that the uniform rule is the only rule
satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto-eﬃciency, and anonymity3 (alternatively, no-
envy4). Ching (1994) strengthened Sprumont’s (1991) characterization by replacing
1Strategy-proofness requires that it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to reveal his
true preference.
2A preference is multidimensional single-peaked if there is an ideal consumption point p ≡
(p1,...,p m), called the peak, and for any two distinct consumption bundles x ≡ (x1,...,x m) and
y ≡ (y1,...,y m), whenever x  is between y  and p  for each dimension   =1 ,...,m, x is strictly
preferred to y. The domain of continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences is a subclass
of the multidimensional single-peaked domain.
3 Anonymity requires that if two agent’s preferences are switched, then their assignments should
be switched too.
4No-envy requires that no agent should prefer anyone else’s assignment to his own.
2anonymity with the weaker condition of symmetry.5
However, it is desirable to analyze the uniform rule allocating several commodi-
ties so that it can be applied to Benassy’s (1982) general equilibrium model with
ﬁxed prices. Consider an economy with money and several (nonmonetary) com-
modities in which money consumption is not bounded. Agents have preferences
which are continuous, separable, linear with respect to money, and strictly convex
in commodities. If the prices are exogenously ﬁxed, then preferences only on con-
sumption of commodities are induced, and they are continuous, strictly convex, and
separable. Our result can be applied to this class of economies.
When preferences are single-peaked, Moulin (1980) ﬁrst characterized the class
of strategy-proof voting schemes in one-dimensional public alternative model. He
established that a rule satisﬁes strategy-proofness and unanimity if and only if it is a
so called “generalized median voter scheme”. Border and Jordan (1983) established
that when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and each agent has continuous,
strictly convex, separable, and star-shaped6 preferences, a rule is strategy-proof and
unanimous if and only if it can be decomposed into a product of one-dimensional
rules, each of which is a generalized median voter scheme. In the same way as Border
and Jordan (1983) generalized Moulin’s (1980) result to a model with several public
alternatives, we generalize Sprumont’s (1991) result to a model with several private
commodities.
Amor´ os (2002) also analyzed this situation. Assuming that there are only two
agents, he showed that a rule on the class of multidimensional single-peaked prefer-
ences satisﬁes strategy-proofness, same-sideness,7 and no-envy (alternatively, strong
symmetry8) if and only if it is the uniform rule.9 In the two-agent case, since know-
ing one agent’s consumption implies knowing the other agent’s consumption, the
model is like a public alternatives model. Thus, the model of Amor´ os (2002) can
be treated as that of Border and Jordan (1983), and his result can be derived from
theirs,10 although his proof diﬀers from theirs. On the other hand, when there
5The single-commodity allotment problem has been analyzed from a wide variety of viewpoints.
See, for example, Thomson (1994a,b, 1995, 1997), Otten, Peters and Volij (1996), Barber` a, Jackson
and Neme (1997), Ching and Serizawa (1998), Mass´ o and Neme (2001, 2007), and Serizawa (2006).
6A preference is star-shaped if there is an ideal consumption point p such that for any bundle
x diﬀering from p, and any real number a ∈ (0,1), a · p +( 1− a) · x is strictly preferred to x and
p is strictly preferred to a · p +( 1− a) · x. Note that, in our model, if a preference is continuous
and strictly convex, then it is star-shaped.
7Same-sideness requires that for each commodity, if the sum of the peak amounts of the com-
modity is greater (smaller) than, or equal to, the supply of the commodity, then each agent’s
assignment of the commodity should be smaller (greater) than, or equal to, his own peak amount
of the commodity. It is a necessary condition for Pareto-eﬃciency.
8Strong symmetry requires that two agents with the same preferences should receive the same
assignments.
9Sasaki (2003) also showed that the uniform rule is the most eﬃcient rule among all strategy-
proof rules in the two-agent and multiple-commodity model.
10Since same-sideness implies unanimity, Border and Jordan’s (1983) result implies that a rule
satisﬁes strategy-proofness and same-sideness if and only if it can be decomposed into a product of
one-dimensional rules, each of which is a generalized median voter scheme. No-envy (alternatively,
strong symmetry) implies that the one-dimensional rule for each commodity is the uniform rule.
3are more than two agents, the result of Border and Jordan (1983) cannot be ap-
plied. Accordingly, we need to devise more complex proof although we owe some
techniques to Sprumont’s (1991), Ching’s (1994), and Border and Jordan’s (1983).
Besides, unanimity is weaker than same-sideness, and symmetry is weaker than
strong symmetry or no-envy. Thus, the result of Amor´ os (2002) is a corollary of
our result.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model and the main
result. Section 3 is devoted to the proof of the result in Section 2. Section 4 provides
concluding remark.
2 The model and the results
Let M ≡{ 1,...,m} be a set of inﬁnitely divisible commodities. Let N ≡{ 1,...,n}
be a set of agents. Assume that 2 ≤ n<∞. For each commodity   ∈ M, there is an
amount W  ∈ R++ to be allocated. Let W ≡ (W1,...,W m) ∈ Rm
++. For each i ∈ N,
agent i’s consumption set is X ≡{ xi ∈ Rm
+ | for each   ∈ M,0 ≤ xi
  ≤ W }, and
agent i’s bundle is a vector xi ≡ (xi
 ) ∈M ∈ X. For each   ∈ M, let X  ≡ [0,W  ]
and X−  ≡

   = [0,W   ].
Each agent i ∈ N has a preference relation Ri on X. A preference Ri is a
complete and transitive binary relation on X. Let P i be the strict preference relation
associated with Ri, and Ii the indiﬀerence relation. Given a preference Ri and a
bundle x ∈ X, the upper contour set of Ri at x is UC(Ri,x) ≡{ y ∈ X | yR i x},
and the lower contour set of Ri at x is LC(Ri,x) ≡{ y ∈ X | xR i y}.A
preference Ri is continuous on X if UC(Ri,x) and LC(Ri,x) are both closed for
each x ∈ X. A preference Ri is strictly convex on X if for each x ∈ X, each
pair {y,z}⊂UC(Ri,x), and each a ∈ (0,1), y  = z implies ay +( 1− a)zP i x.W e
assume that preferences are continuous and strictly convex.11 Given a preference Ri,
let p(Ri) ≡{ x ∈ X | for each y ∈ X,x Ri y} be the set of preferred consumptions
according to Ri. Since Ri is continuous and strictly convex, p(Ri) is a singleton.
We call p(Ri) the peak of Ri and write p(Ri) ≡ (p (Ri)) ∈M. We also deﬁne two
additional properties of preferences.
Deﬁnition 1. A preference relation Ri on X is separable if for each   ∈ M,
each xi
 , ˆ xi
  ∈ X , and each xi
− , ˆ xi
−  ∈ X− ,( xi
 ,x i
− ) Ri (ˆ xi
 ,x i
− ) if and only if
(xi
 , ˆ xi
− ) Ri (ˆ xi
 , ˆ xi
− ).
Deﬁnition 2. A preference relation Ri on X is multidimensional single-peaked
if p(Ri) is a singleton, and for each xi, ˆ xi ∈ X such that xi  =ˆ xi, whenever for each
  ∈ M, either p (Ri) ≥ xi
  ≥ ˆ xi
  or p (Ri) ≤ xi
  ≤ ˆ xi
 ,w eh a v exi P i ˆ xi.
Let R denote the class of continuous, strictly convex, and separable preference
relations on X. Any such relation is multidimensional single-peaked.
A feasible allocation is a list x ≡ (xi)i∈N ∈ Xn such that

i∈N xi = W. Note
that free disposal is not assumed. Let Z ≡{ (x1,...,x n) ∈ Xn |

i∈N xi = W} be
11If Ri is continuous and strictly convex on X, then for each x ∈ X, the set UC(Ri,x) is strictly
convex. The converse is not necessarily true.
4the set of feasible allocations.
A preference proﬁle is a list R ≡ (R1,...,R n) ∈R n. An allocation rule, or
simply a rule, is a function f : Rn → Z. Let R−i be a list of preferences for all
agents except for agent i, that is, R−i ≡ (Rj)j∈N\{i}. We sometimes write the proﬁle
(R1,...,R i−1, ¯ Ri,R i+1,...,R n)a s(¯ Ri,R −i). Let fi(R) ≡ (fi
1(R),...,fi
m(R)) be the
bundle assigned to agent i by f when the preference proﬁle is R.
We now introduce the axioms. Let f be a rule. First is an incentive property:
no agent should obtain an assignment he prefers by misrepresenting his preferences.
Strategy-proofness: For each R ∈R n, each i ∈ N, and each ˆ Ri ∈R , fi(R) Ri
fi( ˆ Ri,R −i).
Our next three axioms are related to eﬃciency. An allocation x ∈ Z is Pareto-
eﬃcient for R if there is no y ∈ Z such that, for each i ∈ N, yi Ri xi, and for
some j ∈ N, yj P j xj. For each R ∈R n, let P(R) be the set of Pareto-eﬃcient
allocations for R.
Pareto-eﬃciency: For each R ∈R n, f(R) ∈ P(R).
Second, for each commodity, if the sum of the peak amounts of the commodity is
greater than, or equal to, the supply of the commodity, then each agent’s assignment
of the commodity should be smaller than, or equal to, his own peak amount of the
commodity, and conversely.
Same-sideness: For each R ∈R n and each   ∈ M,
(i) if

i∈N p (Ri) ≥ W , then for each i ∈ N, fi
 (R) ≤ p (Ri), and
(ii) if

i∈N p (Ri) ≤ W , then for each i ∈ N, fi
 (R) ≥ p (Ri).
In the one-commodity case, same-sideness is equivalent to Pareto-eﬃciency.12
In the multiple-commodity case, Pareto-eﬃciency implies same-sideness, but the
converse is not necessarily true. Example 1 illustrates this fact.
Example 1. Let N ≡{ 1,2} and M ≡{ 1,2}. Let f be the rule deﬁned as follows.13






p (R1)+p (R2) if p (R1)+p (R2) > 0
W 
2 otherwise.
Then, f satisﬁes same-sideness. Let R ∈R 2 be such that for each   ∈{ 1,2},
p (R1)=p (R2)=W , and there is a bundle y1 ∈ Z such that y2 = W − y1 and









f(R) is Pareto-dominated by y, contradicting Pareto-eﬃciency.
Third, if the sum of the peak amounts of each commodity is equal to the supply
of the commodity, then each agent’s assignment should be equal to his own peak
vector.
Unanimity: For each R ∈R n, if for each   ∈ M,

i∈N p (Ri)=W , then for each
i ∈ N, fi(R)=p(Ri).
12See Sprumont (1991)
13This rule is called Proportional Rule.
5Obviously, same-sideness implies unanimity. It is the weakest of our three ax-
ioms related to eﬃciency.
Our next four axioms are related to fairness. First, no agent should prefer anyone
else’s assignment to his own. Second, if two agents’ preferences are switched, then
their assignments should be switched too.
No-envy (Foley, 1967): For each R ∈R n and each i,j ∈ N, fi(R) Ri fj(R).
Anonymity: For each R ∈R n, each i,j ∈ N, and each ˆ Ri, ˆ Rj ∈R ,i f ˆ Ri = Rj
and ˆ Rj = Ri, then fi( ˆ Ri, ˆ Rj,R −i,j)=fj(R) and fj( ˆ Ri, ˆ Rj,R −i,j)=fi(R).
Third, two agents with the same preferences should receive the same assign-
ments.
Strong symmetry: For each R ∈R n and each i,j ∈ N,i fRi = Rj, then fi(R)=
fj(R).
Note that anonymity implies strong symmetry.
Fourth, two agents with the same preferences should receive assignments between
which they are indiﬀerent.
Symmetry: For each R ∈R n and each i,j ∈ N,i fRi = Rj, then fi(R) Ii fj(R).
No-envy and strong symmetry both imply symmetry. Symmetry is the weakest
of our four axioms related to fairness. In the one-commodity case, for any rule
satisfying Pareto-eﬃciency, strong symmetry is equivalent to symmetry.14 However,
in the multiple-commodity case, same-sideness and symmetry do not imply strong
symmetry.
Our ﬁnal axiom says that when an agent’s preferences change, if his assignment
remains the same, then the chosen allocation should remain the same.
Nonbossiness: For each R ∈R n, each i ∈ N, and each ˆ Ri ∈R ,i ffi(R)=
fi( ˆ Ri,R −i), then f(R)=f( ˆ Ri,R −i).
Remark 1. If there are only two agents, then any rule is nonbossy.
Next, we introduce a rule that is central to our paper. For each commodity,
agents are allowed to choose their consumption subject to a common upper or lower
bound, which is chosen so as to attain feasibility.





min{p (Ri),λ  (R)} if

j∈N p (Rj) ≥ W 
max{p (Ri),λ  (R)} if

j∈N p (Rj) ≤ W ,





Example 2 illustrates the deﬁnition.
Example 2. Let N ≡{ 1,2,3,4}, M ≡{ 1,2}, and (W1,W 2) ≡ (10,20). Let




i∈N p1(Ri) >W 1 and

i∈N p2(Ri) <W 2. We calculate λ1(R)=3a n d
λ2(R)=4 .5. Then, U1(R)=( 3 ,5), U2(R)=U3(R)=( 2 ,4.5), and U4(R)=( 3 ,6).
Next is our main result, a characterization of the uniform rule.
Theorem. A rule deﬁned on the domain of continuous, strictly convex, and separa-
ble preferences satisﬁes strategy-proofness, unanimity, symmetry, and nonbossiness
if and only if it is the uniform rule.
We remark that our result can be extended to the domain of continuous, strictly
convex, and multidimensional single-peaked preferences. The following is a corollary
of the Theorem.
Corollary. A rule deﬁned on the domain of continuous, strictly convex, and multi-
dimensional single-peaked preferences satisﬁes strategy-proofness, unanimity, sym-
metry, and nonbossiness if and only if it is the uniform rule.
The proofs of the Theorem and Corollary are in Section 3.
Amor´ os (2002) showed that when there are only two agents, the uniform rule
is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and no-envy (alterna-
tively, strong symmetry). In the two-agent case, by Remark 1, any rule is nonbossy.
As we mentioned above, unanimity is a necessary condition for same-sideness, and
symmetry is weaker than no-envy or strong symmetry. Thus, we obtain his result
as a corollary of our Theorem.
3 Proof of the Theorem
We devote this section to the proof of the Theorem. It is easy to check that the
uniform rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, and symmetric.15 Furthermore, we can
easily verify that the single-commodity uniform rule is nonbossy. Since the uniform
rule assigns commodities by applying the single-commodity uniform rule commodity
by commodity, it too is nonbossy. Thus, the if part of the Theorem holds. We turn
to the only if part.
For each   ∈ M, let Z−  ≡{ (x1
− ,...,x n
− ) ∈ (X− )n | for each     =  ,

i∈N xi
   =
W  } be the set of feasible allocations except for commodity  . Given   ∈ M,
x−  ∈ Z− , and i ∈ N, let ¯ Ri(x− ) ≡{ Ri ∈R|for each     =  ,p  (Ri)=xi
  }
and ¯ RN(x− ) ≡

i∈N ¯ Ri(x− ). Then, all preference proﬁles in ¯ RN(x− ) are the
same except for commodity  , that is, for each R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ) and each     =  , 
i∈N p  (Ri)=W  . For simplicity, given   ∈ M, R ∈R n, and i ∈ N, we write
p− (Ri) ≡ (p  (Ri))   = , fi
− (R) ≡ (fi
  (R))   = , and f− (R) ≡ (f  (R))   = .
Let   ∈ M and x−  ∈ Z− . We ﬁrst restrict the domain of rules to the domain
¯ RN(x− ). We show that on this domain, only the uniform rule satisﬁes the axioms
of the Theorem. Second, we extend the result to the entire domain Rn. This proof
technique is similar to that of Border and Jordan (1983). However, they study a
model with public alternative, whereas we study a model with private commodities
15See Amor´ os (2002) for the formal proofs.
7model. As we explain later, owing to this diﬀerence, the naive application of their
proof techniques would cause problems that we have to overcome.
Our proof of our Theorem is by means of seven Lemmas. Lemma 1 says that
strategy-proofness, unanimity, and nonbossiness imply same-sideness. In the one-
commodity case, if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, and nonbossy, then it is
same-sided (Serizawa, 2006). This implication also holds in the multiple-commodity
case. However, the proofs diﬀer.
Lemma 1. If a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, and nonbossy, then it is same-
sided.
Proof. Let f be a rule satisfying the hypotheses. Let R ∈R n and   ∈ M.
Assume that

h∈N p (Rh) ≤ W . The opposite case can be treated symmetrically.
By contradiction, suppose that there is i ∈ N such that fi
 (R) <p  (Ri). Since 
h∈N p (Rh) ≤ W , there is j ∈ N \{ i} such that f
j
 (R) >p  (Rj). Without
loss of generality, let i = 1 and j = 2. For each k ∈ N \{ 1,2}, let ˆ Rk ∈Rbe
such that p( ˆ Rk)=fk(R). Then, by strategy-proofness, f3( ˆ R3,R −3)=f3(R). By
nonbossiness, f( ˆ R3,R −3)=f(R). Repeating this argument for k =4 ,...,n,w e
obtain f(R1,2, ˆ R−1,2)=f(R).
There are two cases.
Case 1: p (R1) − f1
  (R) ≥ f2
  (R) − p (R2).
Let ( ˆ R1, ˆ R2) ∈R 2 be such that (i) p ( ˆ R1)=f1
  (R)+f2
  (R) − p (R2) and
p ( ˆ R2)=p (R2), (ii) for each i ∈{ 1,2}, p− ( ˆ Ri)=fi
− (R), and (iii) for each
i ∈{ 1,2}, UC( ˆ Ri,fi(R)) ⊂ UC(Ri,fi(R)) and UC( ˆ Ri,fi(R)) ∩ LC(Ri,fi(R)) =
{fi(R)} (Figure 1).16 Then, by strategy-proofness, f1(R2, ˆ R−2)=f1(R1,2, ˆ R−1,2).
By nonbossiness, f(R2, ˆ R−2)=f(R1,2, ˆ R−1,2). Since f(R1,2, ˆ R−1,2)=f(R), we
have f(R2, ˆ R−2)=f(R). Similarly, by strategy-proofness and nonbossiness, f( ˆ R)=
f(R). However, by feasibility, for each    ∈ M,

k∈N p  ( ˆ Rk)=

k∈N fk
  (R)=W  .
This contradicts unanimity.
Case 2: p (R1) − f1
  (R) <f 2
  (R) − p (R2).
Similarly to Case 1, we derive a contradiction to unanimity by using preferences
( ˆ R1, ˆ R2) ∈R 2 such that (i) p ( ˆ R1)=p (R1) and p ( ˆ R2)=f2
  (R) − p (R1)+
f1
  (R), (ii) for each i ∈{ 1,2}, p− ( ˆ Ri)=fi
− (R), and (iii) for each i ∈{ 1,2},
UC( ˆ Ri,fi(R)) ⊂ UC(Ri,fi(R)) and UC( ˆ Ri,fi(R)) ∩ LC(Ri,fi(R)) = {fi(R)}. 
We now introduce two additional properties of rules. First, if an agent’s pref-
erences change but his peak amounts remain the same, then his assignment should
remain the same. Second, if all agents’ preferences change but the peak proﬁles
remain the same, then the chosen allocation should remain the same.
Own peak-onlyness: For each R ∈R n, each i ∈ N, and each ˆ Ri ∈R ,i fp( ˆ Ri)=
p(Ri), then fi(R)=fi( ˆ Ri,R −i).
Peak-onlyness: For each R ∈R n and each ˆ R ∈R n, if for each i ∈ N, p( ˆ Ri)=
p(Ri), then f(R)=f( ˆ R).
16The condition (iii) means that ˆ Ri is a Maskin monotonic transformation of Ri at fi(R). This
notion was ﬁrst deﬁned by Maskin (1999).
8Note that peak-onlyness implies own peak-onlyness. In the one-commodity case,
if a rule is strategy-proof and Pareto-eﬃcient, then it is own peak-only (Sprumont,
1991). In the multiple-commodity case, if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, and
nonbossy, then for each   ∈ M and each x−  ∈ Z− , we can establish the same
property on the domain ¯ RN(x− ). Furthermore, we can also show that if a rule is
nonbossy and own peak-only, then it is peak-only.
Lemma 2. Let f be a strategy-proof, unanimous, and nonbossy rule. Then, for
each   ∈ M, each x−  ∈ Z− , each R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ), and each ˆ R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ) such that
for each i ∈ N, p( ˆ Ri)=p(Ri), we have f( ˆ R)=f(R).
Proof. Let   ∈ M, x−  ∈ Z− , R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ), and ˆ R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ). Assume that
for each i ∈ N, p( ˆ Ri)=p(Ri). First, we show f1(R)=f1( ˆ R1,R −1). By same-
sideness (Lemma 1) and p(R1)=p( ˆ R1), we have f1
− (R)=x1
−  = f1
− ( ˆ R1,R −1).
Assume that

i∈N p (Ri) ≤ W . The opposite case can be treated symmetri-
cally. We ﬁrst show f1
  (R) ≥ f1
  ( ˆ R1,R −1). By contradiction, suppose that f1
  (R) <
f1
  ( ˆ R1,R −1). Then, by same-sideness (Lemma 1), p ( ˆ R1)=p (R1) ≤ f1
  (R) <
f1
  ( ˆ R1,R −1). Thus f1(R) ˆ P 1 f1( ˆ R1,R −1), contradicting strategy-proofness. Thus,
f1
  (R) ≥ f1
  ( ˆ R1,R −1). Similarly, we can show f1
  (R) ≤ f1
  ( ˆ R1,R −1). Hence,
f1(R)=f1( ˆ R1,R −1). By nonbossiness, f(R)=f( ˆ R1,R −1). Repeating this ar-
gument for k =2 ,...,n, we get f( ˆ R)=f(R). 
We introduce two more properties of rules. First, for any commodity and any
agent, if his peak amount of the commodity is smaller (greater) than his assignment
of the commodity and his new peak amount of the commodity is smaller (greater)
than, or equal to, his initial assignment of the commodity, then his assignment of
the commodity should not change. Second, for any commodity and any group of
agents, if for any agent in the group, the same assumption holds, then the chosen
allocation of the commodity should not change.
Own uncompromisingness: For each   ∈ M, each R ∈R n, each i ∈ N, and each
ˆ Ri ∈R ,
if p (Ri) <f i
 (R) and p ( ˆ Ri) ≤ fi
 (R), then, fi
 ( ˆ Ri,R −i)=fi
 (R),
if p (Ri) >f i
 (R) and p ( ˆ Ri) ≥ fi
 (R), then, fi
 ( ˆ Ri,R −i)=fi
 (R).
Group uncompromisingness: For each   ∈ M, each R ∈R n, each ˆ N ⊆ N, and
each ˆ R
ˆ N ∈R | ˆ N|,17
if for each i ∈ ˆ N, p (Ri) <f i
 (R) and p ( ˆ Ri) ≤ fi
 (R), then, f ( ˆ R
ˆ N,R − ˆ N)=f (R),
if for each i ∈ ˆ N, p (Ri) >f i
 (R) and p ( ˆ Ri) ≥ fi
 (R), then, f ( ˆ R
ˆ N,R − ˆ N)=f (R).
In the one-commodity case, if a rule is strategy-proof and Pareto-eﬃcient, then
it satisﬁes own uncompromisingness (Ching, 1994). In the multiple-commodity
case, if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, and nonbossy, then for each   ∈ M
and each x−  ∈ Z− , we can establish the same property on the domain ¯ RN(x− ).
Furthermore, we can also show that nonbossiness and own uncompromisingness
imply group uncompromisingness.
17|A| denotes the cardinality of set A.
9Lemma 3. Let f be a strategy-proof, unanimous, and nonbossy rule. Then, for
each   ∈ M, and each x−  ∈ Z− , we have
(i) Own uncompromisingness:
for each R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ), each i ∈ N, and each ˆ Ri ∈ ¯ Ri(x− ),
if p (Ri) <f i
 (R) and p ( ˆ Ri) ≤ fi
 (R), then, fi( ˆ Ri,R −i)=fi(R),
if p (Ri) >f i
 (R) and p ( ˆ Ri) ≥ fi
 (R), then, fi( ˆ Ri,R −i)=fi(R),
(ii) Group uncompromisingness:
for each R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ), each ˆ N ⊆ N, and each ˆ R
ˆ N ∈

i∈ ˆ N ¯ Ri(x− ),
if for each i ∈ ˆ N, p (Ri) <f i
 (R) and p ( ˆ Ri) ≤ fi
 (R), then, f( ˆ R
ˆ N,R − ˆ N)=f(R),
if for each i ∈ ˆ N, p (Ri) >f i
 (R) and p ( ˆ Ri) ≥ fi
 (R), then, f( ˆ R
ˆ N,R − ˆ N)=f(R).
Proof. Let   ∈ M, x−  ∈ Z− , and R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ).
Proof of (i). Let i ∈ N and ˆ Ri ∈ ¯ Ri(x− ). Assume that p (Ri) <f i
 (R)
and p ( ˆ Ri) ≤ fi
 (R). The opposite case can be treated symmetrically. We show
fi( ˆ Ri,R −i)=fi(R). By same-sideness (Lemma 1), fi
− ( ˆ Ri,R −i)=fi
− (R). Also,
by same-sideness (Lemma 1) and p (Ri) <f i
 (R), for each j ∈ N \{ i},w eh a v e
p (Rj) ≤ f
j
 (R). Since p ( ˆ Ri) ≤ fi
 (R), by feasibility, p ( ˆ Ri)+





 (R)=W . Thus, by same-sideness (Lemma 1), fi
 ( ˆ Ri,R −i) ≥ p ( ˆ Ri). By
contradiction, suppose that fi
 ( ˆ Ri,R −i)  = fi
 (R). There are two cases.
Case 1: fi
 ( ˆ Ri,R −i) >f i
 (R).
In this case, p ( ˆ Ri) ≤ fi
 (R) <f i
 ( ˆ Ri,R −i). Thus, fi(R) ˆ P i fi( ˆ Ri,R −i), contra-
dicting strategy-proofness.
Case 2: fi
 ( ˆ Ri,R −i) <f i
 (R).
Let ¯ Ri ∈Rbe such that p( ¯ Ri)=p(Ri) and fi( ˆ Ri,R −i) ¯ P i fi(R). Then, by
peak-onlyness (Lemma 2), fi( ¯ Ri,R −i)=fi(R). Thus, fi( ˆ Ri,R −i) ¯ P i fi( ¯ Ri,R −i),
contradicting strategy-proofness. 
Proof of (ii). Let ˆ N ⊆ N and ˆ R
ˆ N ∈

i∈ ˆ N ¯ Ri(x− ). Assume that for each i ∈ ˆ N,
p (Ri) <f i
 (R) and p ( ˆ Ri) ≤ fi
 (R). The opposite case can be treated symmetrically.
Without loss of generality, let ˆ N ≡{ 1,...,ˆ n}.
By own uncompromisingness (Lemma 3-i), f1( ˆ R1,R −1)=f1(R). By nonbossi-
ness, f( ˆ R1,R −1)=f(R). Repeating the same argument for k =2 ,...,ˆ n,w eh a v e
f( ˆ R
ˆ N,R − ˆ N)=f(R). 
We deﬁne a class of preferences, which we call almost indiﬀerent to all com-
modities except for commodity  . Given   ∈ M, xi
  ∈{ 0,W  }, xi
−  ∈ X− ,




− ,d) ⊂Rbe the set of preferences Ri such that (i)
p(Ri)=( xi
 ,x i
− ), and (ii) for each y  ∈ [0,W   − d] and each y−  ∈ X− ,w eh a v e
if x
i
  =0 , then (y ,y − ) P




  = W , then (y  + d,y− ) P
i (y ,p − (R
i)). (2)
See Figure 2 for an illustration of such a preference relation. Note that for each   ∈
M, each xi
  ∈{ 0,W  }, each xi
−  ∈ X− , and each d ∈ (0,
W 
2n), the set RV(xi
 ,x i
− ,d)
10is nonempty.18 Given   ∈ M, xi
  ∈{ 0,W  }, and xi
−  ∈ X− , for suﬃciently small
d>0, all preferences in RV(xi
 ,x i
− ,d) almost never depend on the consumption of
commodities other than commodity  .
Lemma 4 says that for a strategy-proof rule, and for any commodity, when
an agent’s preference changes, if both his old and his new preferences are almost
indiﬀerent to all commodities except for the commodity, then his assignment of the
commodity changes little.
Lemma 4. Let f be a strategy-proof rule. Let   ∈ M, d ∈ (0,
W 
2n), i ∈ N, xi
  ∈
{0,W  }, ¯ xi
− , ˜ xi
−  ∈ X− , ¯ Ri ∈R V(xi
 , ¯ xi
− ,d), ˜ Ri ∈R V(xi
 , ˜ xi












 ( ¯ R
i,R
−i)+d. (3)
Proof. Assume that xi
  = 0. By a similar argument, we can also show that (3)
holds when xi
  = W . The proof is in two steps.
Step 1. fi
 ( ˜ Ri,R −i) <f i
 ( ¯ Ri,R −i)+d.
Proof. There are two cases.
Case 1-1: fi
 ( ¯ Ri,R −i) >W   − d.
In this case, fi
 ( ¯ Ri,R −i)+d>W   ≥ fi
 ( ˜ Ri,R −i).
Case 1-2 (Figure 3): fi
 ( ¯ Ri,R −i) ≤ W  − d.
By contradiction, suppose that
f
i




 ( ¯ R
i,R
−i)+d. (4)
Then, since ˜ Ri ∈R V(xi
 , ˜ xi









 ( ¯ R
i,R







 ( ¯ R
i,R



















 ( ¯ Ri,R −i) − d<f i
 ( ˜ Ri,R −i).
Proof. There are two cases.
Case 2-1: fi
 ( ¯ Ri,R −i) <d .
In this case, fi
 ( ¯ Ri,R −i) − d<0 ≤ fi
 ( ˜ Ri,R −i).
Case 2-2 (Figure 4): fi
 ( ¯ Ri,R −i) ≥ d.
By contradiction, suppose that
f
i
 ( ¯ R
i,R
−i) − d ≥ f
i
 ( ˜ R
i,R
−i). (5)
18We can show that such a preference exists by constructing a separable and quadratic prefer-
ence. See Fact in Appendix.
11Then, since ¯ Ri ∈R V(xi
 , ¯ xi









 ( ˜ R
i,R







 ( ˜ R
i,R


















Lemma 5 says that for a symmetric rule, and for any commodity, when two
agents have a same preference, if the preference is almost indiﬀerent to all com-
modities except for the commodity, then their assignments of the commodity diﬀer
little.
Lemma 5. Let f be a symmetric rule. Let   ∈ M, d ∈ (0,
W 
2n), x  ∈{ 0,W  },












 ( ˜ R
i,j,R
−i,j)+d. (6)
Proof. Assume that xi
  = 0. By a similar argument, we can also show that (6)
holds when xi
  = W . The proof is in two steps.
Step 1. f
j
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j) <f i
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j)+d.
Proof. There are two cases.
Case 1-1: fi
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j) >W   − d.
In this case, fi
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j)+d>W   ≥ f
j
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j).
Case 1-2 (Figure 5): fi
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j) ≤ W  − d.
By contradiction, suppose that
f
j




 ( ˜ R
i,j,R
−i,j)+d. (7)









 ( ˜ R
i,j,R







 ( ˜ R
i,j,R



















 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j) − d<f
j
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j).
Proof. There are two cases.
Case 2-1: fi
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j) <d .
12In this case, fi
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j) − d<0 ≤ f
j
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j).
Case 2-2 (Figure 6): fi
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j) ≥ d.
By contradiction, suppose that
f
i
 ( ˜ R
i,j,R
−i,j) − d ≥ f
j
 ( ˜ R
i,j,R
−i,j). (8)









 ( ˜ R
i,j,R







 ( ˜ R
i,j,R


















Next Lemma follows from Lemmas 4 and 5.
Lemma 6. Let f be a strategy-proof and symmetric rule. Let ˆ N   N, i ∈ N \ ˆ N,
and K = N \ ( ˆ N ∪{ i}).L e t   ∈ M, d ∈ (0,
W 
2n), xi
  ∈{ 0,W  }, ¯ xi
− , ˜ xi
−  ∈ X− ,
¯ Ri ∈R V(xi
 , ¯ xi
− ,d), ˜ Ri ∈R V(xi
 , ˜ xi
− ,d), and RK ∈R |K|. For each j ∈ ˆ N, let















ˆ N, ¯ R
i)+d, and (9)




ˆ N, ¯ R









ˆ N, ¯ R
i)+2· d.
(10)
Proof. Since ¯ Ri ∈R V(xi
 , ¯ xi
− ,d), ˜ Ri ∈R V(xi
 , ˜ xi
− ,d), and (RK, ˜ R
ˆ N) ∈R n−1,
Lemma 4 implies (9). Next, we show (10). Let j ∈ ˆ N. Since ˜ Rj = ˜ Ri, ˜ Rj ∈
RV(xi
 , ˜ xi
− ,d), and (RK, ˜ R















ˆ N, ˜ R
i)+d.
Now, (10) follows from (9). 
Consider a rule f satisfying the axioms of the Theorem on the domain Rn. Given
  ∈ M and x−  ∈ Z− , when a preference proﬁle belongs to ¯ RN(x− ), by same-
sideness (Lemma 1), each agent receives his own peak amounts of all commodities
except for commodity   (or, including commodity   in the case where the sum of
the peak amounts of commodity   is also equal to the supply of commodity  ).
Accordingly, on ¯ RN(x− ), f induces a rule for commodity  . Lemma 7 says that
this induced rule is the single-commodity uniform rule. Although we borrow some
techniques from Sprumont (1991) and Ching (1994), as we discuss below, we cannot
directly apply their proofs to obtain Lemma 7.
13Let   ∈ M and x−  ∈ Z− . For each i ∈ N and each Ri ∈ ¯ Ri(x− ), let ¯ R(Ri)b e
a preference relation on [0,W  ] such that for each xi
 ,yi
  ∈ [0,W  ], xi
  ¯ R(Ri) yi
  if and
only if (xi
 ,x i
− ) Ri (yi
 ,x i
− ). Let ¯ P(Ri) be the strict relation associated with ¯ R(Ri),
and ¯ I(Ri) the indiﬀerence relation. Let ¯ R  ≡{¯ R(Ri) | Ri ∈R i(x− )}. Then, any
preference in ¯ R  is continuous and single-peaked on [0,W  ].
Consider the restriction ¯ f of a rule f to ¯ RN(x− ). If f is strategy-proof, then
for each R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ), each i ∈ N, and each ˆ Ri ∈ ¯ Ri(x− ), we have ¯ fi
 (R) ¯ R(Ri)
¯ fi
 ( ˆ Ri,R −i). Thus ¯ f  is strategy-proof. When f is same-sided, for each R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ),
if

j∈N p (Rj) ≥ W , then for all i ∈ N, ¯ fi
 (R) ≤ p (Ri), and if

j∈N p (Rj) ≤ W ,
then for all i ∈ N, ¯ fi
 (R) ≥ p (Ri). Thus ¯ f  is Pareto-eﬃcient.
Assume that ¯ f  is symmetric for commodity  , that is, for each R ∈ ¯ RN(x− )
and each i,j ∈ N,i f¯ R(Ri)= ¯ R(Rj), then ¯ fi
 (R) ¯ I(Ri) ¯ f
j
 (R). Then, since the
single-commodity uniform rule is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto-
eﬃciency, and symmetry (Sprumont, 1991; Ching, 1994), ¯ f  is the single-commodity
uniform rule.
Therefore, if symmetry implied symmetry for commodity  , then we could di-
rectly apply their result to obtain Lemma 7. However, symmetry does not imply
symmetry for commodity  . We illustrate this point in the next Example.
Example 3. Let N ≡{ 1,2} and M ≡{ 1,2}. Let f be the rule on R2 deﬁned





f1(R) ≡ p(R1), and f2(R) ≡ (W1,W 2) − p(R1). Note that f satisﬁes symmetry.









. Let ¯ f be the restriction of f to ¯ RN(x−1)




3 = p2(R2), we have R1  = R2. By the deﬁnition of ¯ f, ¯ f1
1(R)=p1(R1) and
¯ f2
1(R)=W1 − p1(R1). Thus, ¯ f1
1(R) ¯ P(R2) ¯ f2
1(R). In fact, ¯ f1 is dictatorial, and so
it violates symmetry for commodity 1.
Furthermore, as we discussed in Section 2, in the one-commodity case, any
Pareto-eﬃcient and symmetric rule is strongly symmetric. Ching (1994) could ap-
ply strong symmetry to prove this uniqueness result. However, in the multiple-
commodity case, since same-sideness and symmetry do not imply strong symmetry,
we cannot apply strong symmetry to obtain Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. Let f be a strategy-proof, unanimous, symmetric, and nonbossy rule.
Then, for each   ∈ M, each x−  ∈ Z− , each R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ), and each i ∈ N,
fi(R)=Ui(R).
Proof. Let   ∈ M.B y same-sideness (Lemma 1), for each x−  ∈ Z− , each
R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ), each i ∈ N, and each     =  , we have fi
  (R)=xi
   = Ui
  (R).




Let x−  ∈ Z−  and R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ) be such that

i∈N p (Ri)=W . Then, by the
deﬁnition of U, for each i ∈ N, Ui
 (R)=p (Ri). By same-sideness (Lemma 1), for
each i ∈ N, we have fi
 (R)=p (Ri). Thus, for each x−  ∈ Z− , each R ∈ ¯ RN(x− )
such that

i∈N p (Ri)=W , and each i ∈ N, we have fi
 (R)=Ui
 (R).
Next, we show that for each x−  ∈ Z− , each R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ) such that

i∈N p (Ri) <
W , and each i ∈ N,w eh a v efi
 (R)=Ui
 (R).
14We introduce some notations. Given a preference proﬁle R ∈R n, let π ≡
(π1,...,π n) be the permutation of N such that p (Rπ1(R)) ≥···≥p (Rπn(R)). We
simply write π1,...,π n when we can omit R as an argument without confusion. Let
RN
  (0) be the set of preference proﬁles R such that

i∈N p (Ri) <W   and for each
i ∈ N, p (Ri) ≤
W 
n . Given k ∈{ 1,...,n− 1}, let RN
  (k) be the set of preference
proﬁles R such that






























  (k)={R ∈R n |

i∈N p (Ri) <W  }. For each k ∈{ 0,1,...,n−
1}, let RN
  (k,0) be the subdomain of RN
  (k) such that for each j ∈{ k +1 ,...,n},
p (Rπj)=0 .
For each k ∈{ 0,1,...,n− 1} and each x−  ∈ Z− , let ¯ RN(k,x− ) ≡R N
  (k) ∩
¯ RN(x− ). Note that for each x−  ∈ Z− ,
	n−1
k=0 ¯ RN(k,x− )={R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ) | 
i∈N p (Ri) <W  }.
By induction, we will show that for each k ∈{ 0,1,...,n− 1}, each x−  ∈ Z− ,
each R ∈ ¯ RN(k,x− ), and each i ∈ N,w eh a v efi
 (R)=Ui
 (R).




Proof. Let x−  ∈ Z−  and R ∈ ¯ RN(0,x − ). In this case, by the deﬁnition of
U, for each i ∈ N, Ui
 (R)=
W 




Let ˆ R ∈ ¯ RN(x− ) be such that for each i ∈ N, p ( ˆ Ri) = 0. If for each i ∈ N,
fi
 ( ˆ R)=
W 
n , then, by group uncompromisingness (Lemma 3-ii), f( ˆ R)=f(R).
Thus, we only have to show that for each i ∈ N, fi
 ( ˆ R)=
W 
n .
By contradiction, suppose that there is j ∈ N such that f
j
 ( ˆ R) >
W 
n . Without
loss of generality, let j = 1. Denote e1 ≡ f1
  ( ˆ R) −
W 
n . For each k ∈ N \{ 1}, let
ek ≡
ek−1







and (iii) for each k ∈{ 2,3,...,n},
ek−1











2·n!. For each i ∈ N, let ¯ Ri ∈R V(0,p − (Ri),d), and ¯ R ≡ ( ¯ R1,..., ¯ Rn).
Then, by peak-onlyness (Lemma 2), f( ¯ R)=f( ˆ R).
15Let ˜ x−  ∈ X− , ˜ R0 ∈R V(0, ˜ x− ,d), and ˜ R1
0 ≡ ˜ R0.
Step 1-1. f1
  ( ˜ R1
0, ¯ R−1) ≥
W 
n + e1 = f1
  ( ˆ R).
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that f1
  ( ˜ R1
0, ¯ R−1) <
W 
n + e1. Since f( ¯ R)=
f( ˆ R), we have f1
  ( ¯ R)=
W 
n + e1. Let ˇ R1 ∈Rbe such that p( ˇ R1)=p( ¯ R1) and
f1( ˜ R1
0, ¯ R−1) ˇ P 1 f1( ¯ R). Then, by peak-onlyness (Lemma 2), f1( ˇ R1, ¯ R−1)=f1( ¯ R).
Thus, f1( ˜ R1
0, ¯ R−1) ˇ P 1 f1( ˇ R1, ¯ R−1), contradicting strategy-proofness. 
Given ˆ N ⊂ N, let ˜ R
ˆ N
0 be such that for each i ∈ ˆ N, ˜ Ri
0 = ˜ R0.
Step 1-2. For each k ∈{ 1,2,...,n},
(a) if k is even, then there is ˆ N ⊂ N such that | ˆ N| = k and for each i ∈ ˆ N,w e
have fi
 ( ˜ R
ˆ N
0 , ¯ R− ˆ N) ≤
W 
n − ek, and
(b) if k is odd, then there is ˆ N ⊂ N such that | ˆ N| = k and for each i ∈ ˆ N, we have
fi
 ( ˜ R
ˆ N
0 , ¯ R− ˆ N) ≥
W 
n + ek.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on k. Let k ∈{ 1,2,...,n}. When k =1 ,
by Step 1-1, we have already proven that (b) holds. Assume that k ≥ 2.
Case (a) (Figure 8): k is even.
Our induction hypothesis is that there is ¯ N ⊂ N such that | ¯ N| = k −1, and for
each i ∈ ¯ N, fi
 ( ˜ R
¯ N
0 , ¯ R− ¯ N) ≥
W 
n + ek−1.
Suppose on the contrary that for each j ∈ N \ ¯ N, f
j
 ( ˜ R
¯ N












 ( ˜ R
¯ N
0 , ¯ R
− ¯ N) (by feasibility)












n − k +1

= W  +( k − 2) · ek−1
≥ W , (by k ≥ 2 and ek−1 > 0)
which is a contradiction.
Thus, there is j ∈ N\ ¯ N such that f
j
 ( ˜ R
¯ N




n−k+1. Let ˆ N ≡{ j}∪ ¯ N
and ˜ R
j
0 ≡ ˜ R0. Let i ∈ ˆ N. Then,
f
i
 ( ˜ R
ˆ N
0 , ¯ R
− ˆ N) <f
j
 ( ˜ R
¯ N
0 , ¯ R

























− ek. (by k ≥ 2 and (11))
Case (b) (Figure 9): k is odd.
Our induction hypothesis is that there is ¯ N ⊂ N such that | ¯ N| = k −1, and for
each i ∈ ¯ N, fi
 ( ˜ R
¯ N
0 , ¯ R− ¯ N) ≤
W 
n − ek−1.
16Suppose on the contrary that for each j ∈ N \ ¯ N, f
j
 ( ˜ R
¯ N












 ( ˜ R
¯ N
0 , ¯ R
− ¯ N) (by feasibility)












n − k +1

= W  − (k − 2) · ek−1
≤ W , (by k ≥ 2 and ek−1 > 0)
which is a contradiction.
Thus, there is j ∈ N\ ¯ N such that f
j
 ( ˜ R
¯ N




n−k+1. Let ˆ N ≡{ j}∪ ¯ N
and ˜ R
j
0 ≡ ˜ R0. Let i ∈ ˆ N. Then,
f
i
 ( ˜ R
ˆ N
0 , ¯ R
− ˆ N) >f
j
 ( ˜ R
¯ N
0 , ¯ R






n − k +1


















+ ek. (by k ≥ 2 and (11))
Thus, Step 1-2 holds. 
Step 1-3. We derive a contradiction to conclude that for each i ∈ N, fi
 ( ˆ R)=
W 
n .
There are two cases.
Case 1: n is even.
Then, by Case (a) of Step 1-2, for each i ∈ N, fi
 ( ˜ RN
0 ) ≤
W 







 ( ˜ R
N







<W  , (by en > 0)
which is a contradiction.
Case 2: n is odd.
Then, by Case (b) of Step 1-2, for each i ∈ N, fi
 ( ˜ RN
0 ) ≥
W 







 ( ˜ R
N







>W  , (by en > 0)
which is a contradiction.
17Therefore, for each i ∈ N,w eh a v efi
 ( ˆ R)=
W 
n . 
Step 2. Let k ∈{ 0,1,...,n− 2}. Assume that for each h ∈{ 0,1,...,k}, each
ˆ x−  ∈ Z− , each ¯ R ∈ ¯ RN(h, ˆ x− ), and each i ∈ N, we have fi
 ( ¯ R)=Ui
 ( ¯ R). Then,
for each R ∈R N
  (k +1 ,0) and each i ∈{ π1,...,π k+1}, we have fi
 (R)=p (Ri).
Proof. Let R ∈R N
  (k +1 ,0). Without loss of generality, assume that agents are
indexed so that p (R1) ≥···≥p (Rk+1). Let ¯ K ≡{ 1,2,...,k+1 }.
Step 2-1. Let ˆ x−  ∈ Z−  and ˆ R ∈R N(ˆ x− ) be such that for each i ∈ N, p ( ˆ Ri)=
p (Ri). Then, for each i ∈ ¯ K, we have fi
 ( ˆ R)=p ( ˆ Ri).
Proof. Let i ∈ ¯ K. By contradiction, suppose that fi
 ( ˆ R)  = p ( ˆ Ri). By same-
sideness (Lemma 1), fi
 ( ˆ R) >p  ( ˆ Ri).
Let ˜ Ri
0 ∈Rbe such that p ( ˜ Ri
0) = 0 and p− ( ˜ Ri
0)=p− ( ˆ Ri). Then, by own
uncompromisingness (Lemma 3-i), fi
 ( ˜ Ri
0, ˆ R−i)=fi
 ( ˆ R). Note that for some h ∈
{0,1,...,k},w eh a v e(˜ Ri
0, ˆ R−i) ∈ ¯ RN(h, ˆ x− ).
By the assumption of Step 2, fi
 ( ˜ Ri
0, ˆ R−i)=Ui
 ( ˜ Ri
0, ˆ R−i). Also, by the deﬁnition
of U and ˆ R ∈R N
  (k +1 ,0), we have Ui
 ( ˆ R)=p ( ˆ Ri). Since p ( ˜ Ri
0)=0<p  ( ˆ Ri),
by the deﬁnition of U, we get Ui
 ( ˜ Ri
0, ˆ R−i) ≤ Ui
 ( ˆ R). Thus, fi
 ( ˜ Ri
0, ˆ R−i) ≤ p ( ˆ Ri) <
fi
 ( ˆ R)=fi
 ( ˜ Ri
0, ˆ R−i), which is a contradiction. 
Step 2-2. For each i ∈ ¯ K, we have fi
 (R)=p (Ri).
Proof. Let ¯ R ∈R n be such that for each i ∈ N, (i) p ( ¯ Ri)=p (Ri), (ii)
p− ( ¯ Ri)=fi
− (R), and (iii) UC( ¯ Ri,fi(R)) ⊂ UC(Ri,fi(R)) and UC( ¯ Ri,fi(R)) ∩
LC(Ri,fi(R)) = {fi(R)} (Figure 10).
Then, by strategy-proofness, f1( ¯ R1,R −1)=f1(R). By nonbossiness, f( ¯ R1,R −1)=
f(R). Repeating the same argument for i =2 ,...,n,w eh a v ef( ¯ R)=f(R).
By feasibility, f− (R) ∈ Z− . Since for each i ∈ N, p− ( ¯ Ri)=fi
− (R), we have
¯ R ∈R N(f− (R)). By Step 2-1 and for each i ∈ N, p ( ¯ Ri)=p (Ri), it follows that
for each i ∈ ¯ K, fi
 ( ¯ R)=p ( ¯ Ri)=p (Ri). Since f( ¯ R)=f(R), for each i ∈ ¯ K,w e
have fi
 (R)=p (Ri). 
Step 3. For each k ∈{ 1,2,...,n− 2}, each x−  ∈ Z− , each R ∈ ¯ RN(k,x− ), and
each i ∈ N, we have fi
 (R)=Ui
 (R).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on k. Let k ∈{ 1,2,...,n− 2}. Assume
that
(A) For each h ∈{ 0,1,...,k−1}, each ˆ x−  ∈ Z− , each ¯ R ∈ ¯ RN(h, ˆ x− ), and each
i ∈ N, we have fi
 ( ¯ R)=Ui
 ( ¯ R).
By Step 1, we have already proven that (A) holds when k = 1. We will prove
that




Let x−  ∈ Z−  and R ∈ ¯ RN(k,x− ). Without loss of generality, we may assume
that agents are indexed so that p (R1) ≥···≥p (Rn). Let K ≡{ 1,2,...,k}.
18Then, by the deﬁnition of U, for each i ∈ K, Ui
 (R)=p (Ri), and for each






n−k = λ (R). Note that, since R ∈ ¯ RN(k,x− )
implies





Let ˆ R−K ∈R |−K| be such that for each i ∈ N \ K, p ( ˆ Ri)=0a n dp− ( ˆ Ri)=
p− (Ri). Then, by the deﬁnition of U, for each i ∈ N, Ui
 (RK, ˆ R−K)=Ui
 (R). If
for each i ∈ N, fi
 (RK, ˆ R−K)=Ui
 (RK, ˆ R−K), then, by group uncompromisingness
(Lemma 3-ii), f(R)=f(RK, ˆ R−K). Thus, we only have to show for each i ∈ N,
fi
 (RK, ˆ R−K)=Ui
 (RK, ˆ R−K).
By (A) and Step 2, we have already proven that for each i ∈ K, fi
 (RK, ˆ R−K)=
p (Ri). Thus, we only show that for each i ∈ N \ K, fi
 (RK, ˆ R−K)=λ (R).
By contradiction, suppose that there is j ∈ N \ K such that f
j
 (RK, ˆ R−K) >
λ (R). Without loss of generality, assume that j = k + 1. Note that, since for each
i ∈ K, fi
 (RK, ˆ R−K)=p (Ri), and for each i ∈{ k +2 ,...,n}, fi
 (RK, ˆ R−K) ≥ 0,
by feasibility, f
k+1
  (RK, ˆ R−K) ≤ W  −
k
i=1 p (Ri).
Let e1 ≡ f
k+1
  (RK, ˆ R−K) − λ (R). For each h ∈{ 2,3,...,n− k}, let eh ≡
eh−1
n−k−h+2. Then, (i) for each h ∈{ 2,3,...,n−k}, eh > 0 and eh <e h−1, (ii) for each




t=0(n − k − t)
,
and (iii) for each h ∈{ 2,3,...,n− k},
eh−1











2·(n−k)!. For each i ∈ N \ K, let ¯ Ri ∈R V(0,p − ( ˆ Ri),d), and ¯ R−K ≡
( ¯ Rk+1,..., ¯ Rn). Then, by peak-onlyness (Lemma 2), f(RK, ¯ R−K)=f(RK, ˆ R−K).
Let ˜ x−  ∈ Z− , ˜ R0 ∈R V
0 (0, ˜ x− ,d), and ˜ R
k+1
0 ≡ ˜ R0.
Step 3-1. f
k+1
  (RK, ˜ R
k+1
0 , ¯ R−K∪{k+1}) ≥ λ (R)+e1 = f
k+1
  (RK, ˆ R−K).
Proof. The proof is similar to Step 1-1. By contradiction, suppose not. Since
f(RK, ¯ R−K)=f(RK, ˆ R−K), we have f
k+1
  (RK, ¯ R−K)=λ (R)+e1. Let ˇ Rk+1 ∈Rbe
such that p( ˇ Rk+1)=p( ¯ Rk+1) and fk+1(RK, ˜ R
k+1
0 , ¯ R−K∪{k+1}) ˇ P k+1 fk+1(RK, ¯ R−K).
Then, by peak-onlyness (Lemma 2), fk+1(RK, ˇ Rk+1, ¯ R−K∪{k+1})=fk+1(RK, ¯ R−K).
Thus, fk+1(RK, ˜ R
k+1
0 , ¯ R−K∪{k+1}) ˇ P k+1 fk+1(RK, ˇ Rk+1, ¯ R−K∪{k+1}), contradicting
strategy-proofness. 
Given ˆ N ⊂ N \ K, let ˜ R
ˆ N
0 be such that for each i ∈ ˆ N, ˜ Ri
0 = ˜ R0.
Step 3-2. For each h ∈{ 1,2,...,n− k},
(a) if h is even, then there is ˆ N ⊂ N \K such that | ˆ N| = h and for each i ∈ ˆ N,w e
have fi
 (RK, ˜ R
ˆ N
0 , ¯ R−K∪ ˆ N) ≤ λ (R) − eh, and
(b) if h is odd, then there is ˆ N ⊂ N \ K such that | ˆ N| = h and for each i ∈ ˆ N,w e
have fi
 (RK, ˜ R
ˆ N
0 , ¯ R−K∪ ˆ N) ≥ λ (R)+eh.
19Proof. The proof is similar to Step 1-2, and proceeds by induction on h. Let
h ∈{ 1,2,...,n− k}. When h = 1, by Step 3-1, we have already proven that (b)
holds. Assume that h ≥ 2.
Case (a): h is even.
Our induction hypothesis is that there is ¯ N ⊂ N \K such that | ¯ N| = h−1 and
for each i ∈ ¯ N, fi
 (RK, ˜ R
¯ N
0 , ¯ R−K∪ ¯ N) ≥ λ (R)+eh−1.
Suppose on the contrary that for each j ∈ N \ (K ∪ ¯ N), f
j
 (RK, ˜ R
¯ N
0 , ¯ R−K∪ ¯ N) >
λ (R)−
eh−1
n−k−h+1. By (A) and Step 2, for each i ∈ K, fi
 (RK, ˜ R
¯ N











0 , ¯ R










n − k − h +1






i)+( n − k) · λ (R)=W )
≥ W , (by h ≥ 2 and eh−1 > 0)
which is a contradiction. Thus, there is j ∈ N\(K∪ ¯ N) such that f
j
 (RK, ˜ R
¯ N




Let ˆ N ≡ ¯ N ∪{ j} and ˜ R
j






0 , ¯ R





0 , ¯ R
−K∪ ¯ N)+2· d (by Lemma 6)
≤ λ (R) −
eh−1
n − k − h +1
+2· d
= λ (R) −
eh−1







2 · (n − k)!

≤ λ (R) − eh. (by h ≥ 2 and (12))
Case (b): h is odd.
Our induction hypothesis is that there is ¯ N ⊂ N \K such that | ¯ N| = h−1 and
for each i ∈ ¯ N, fi
 (RK, ˜ R
¯ N
0 , ¯ R−K∪ ¯ N) ≤ λ (R) − eh−1.
Suppose on the contrary that for each j ∈ N \ (K ∪ ¯ N), f
j
 (RK, ˜ R
¯ N
0 , ¯ R−K∪ ¯ N) <
λ (R)+
eh−1
n−k−h+1. By (A) and Step 2, for each i ∈ K, fi
 (RK, ˜ R
¯ N











0 , ¯ R










n − k − h +1






i)+( n − k) · λ (R)=W )
≤ W , (by h ≥ 2 and eh−1 > 0)
20which is a contradiction. Thus, there is j ∈ N\(K∪ ¯ N) such that f
j
 (RK, ˜ R
¯ N




Let ˆ N ≡ ¯ N ∪{ j} and ˜ R
j






0 , ¯ R





0 , ¯ R
−K∪ ¯ N) − 2 · d (by Lemma 6)
≥ λ (R)+
eh−1
n − k − h +1
− 2 · d
= λ (R)+
eh−1







2 · (n − k)!

≥ λ (R)+eh. (by h ≥ 2 and (12))
Thus, Step 3-2 holds. 
Step 3-3. We derive a contradiction to conclude that for each i ∈ N\K, fi
 (RK, ˆ R−K)=
λ (R).
By (A) and Step 2, for each i ∈ K, fi
 (RK, ˜ R
−K
0 )=p (Ri).
There are two cases.
Case 1: n − k is even.
Then, by Case (a) of Step 3-1, for each i ∈ N \ K,w eh a v efi
 (RK, ˜ R
−K
0 ) ≤
















i)+( n − k) · λ (R) − (n − k) · en−k





i)+( n − k) · λ (R)=W )
<W  , (by n − k ≥ 2 and en−k > 0)
which is a contradiction.
Case 2: n − k is odd.
Then, by Case (b) of Step 3-1, for each i ∈ N \ K,w eh a v efi



















i)+( n − k) · λ (R)+( n − k) · en−k





i)+( n − k) · λ (R)=W )
>W  , (by n − k ≥ 2 and en−k > 0)
which is a contradiction.
Therefore, for each i ∈ N \ K,w eh a v efi
 (RK, ˆ R−K)=λ (R). 




Proof. Let x−  ∈ Z−  and R ∈ ¯ RN(n − 1,x − ). Without loss of generality, we
may assume that p (R1) ≥· · ·≥p (Rn). Then, by the deﬁnition of U, for each
i ∈ N \{ n}, Ui
 (R)=p (Ri), and Un
  (R)=W  −
n−1
i=1 p (Ri). Let ˆ Rn ∈Rbe
such that p ( ˆ Rn) = 0 and p− ( ˆ Rn)=p− (Rn). By Steps 1 and 3, when k = n − 2,
we have already proven that the assumption of Step 2 holds. Thus Step 2 implies
that for each i ∈ N \{ n}, fi
 ( ˆ Rn,R −n)=p (Ri). By feasibility, fn
  ( ˆ Rn,R −n)=
W  −
n−1
i=1 p (Ri). Since

i∈N p (Ri) <W  ,w eh a v eW  −
n−1
i=1 p (Ri) > 0.
Thus p ( ˆ Rn) <f  ( ˆ Rn,R −n). By own uncompromisingness (Lemma 3-i), f(R)=
f( ˆ Rn,R −n). Thus, for each i ∈ N, we have fi
 (R)=Ui
 (R). 
In the same way, we can also show that for each x−  ∈ Z− , each R ∈ ¯ RN(x− )
such that

i∈N p (Ri) >W  , and each i ∈ N, we have fi
 (R)=Ui
 (R).
We have completed the proof of Lemma 7. 
Proof of the Theorem. Let f be a strategy-proof, unanimous, symmetric, and
nonbossy rule. We will show that for each R ∈R n and each   ∈ M, f (R)=
U (R). Let R ∈R n and   ∈ M. Let ¯ R ∈R n be such that for each i ∈ N, (i)
p ( ¯ Ri)=p (Ri), (ii) p− ( ¯ Ri)=fi
− (R), and (iii) UC( ¯ Ri,fi(R)) ⊂ UC(Ri,fi(R))
and UC( ¯ Ri,fi(R)) ∩ LC(Ri,fi(R)) = {fi(R)} (Figure 10). By strategy-proofness,
f1( ¯ R1,R −1)=f1(R). By nonbossiness, f( ¯ R1,R −1)=f(R). Repeating the same
argument for i =2 ,...,n,w eh a v ef( ¯ R)=f(R).
By feasibility, f− (R) ∈ Z− . Since for each i ∈ N, p− ( ¯ Ri)=fi
− (R), we
have ¯ R ∈ ¯ RN(f− (R)). Thus Lemma 7 implies f ( ¯ R)=U ( ¯ R). By the deﬁnition
of U, U ( ¯ R)=U (R). Thus, f ( ¯ R)=U (R). Since f( ¯ R)=f(R), we obtain
f (R)=U (R). 
Proof of the Corollary. Let f be a strategy-proof, unanimous, symmetric, and
nonbossy rule deﬁned on the domain Rn
M of continuous, strictly convex, and mul-
tidimensional single-peaked preferences. Let R ∈R n
M. Let ˆ R ∈R n be such that
for each i ∈ N, (i) p( ˆ Ri)=p(Ri), and (ii) UC( ˆ Ri,fi(R)) ⊂ UC(Ri,fi(R)) and
UC( ˆ Ri,fi(R))∩LC(Ri,fi(R)) = {fi(R)}. Then, by strategy-proofness, f1( ˆ R1,R −1)=
f1(R). By nonbossiness, f( ˆ R1,R −1)=f(R). Repeating the same argument for
i =2 ,...,n,w eh a v ef( ˆ R)=f(R). By the Theorem, f( ˆ R)=U( ˆ R). Since the
uniform rule is peak-only, U(R)=U( ˆ R). Hence, f(R)=U(R). 
4 Concluding Remarks
We considered the problem of allocating several inﬁnitely divisible commodities
among agents with continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. We estab-
lished that a rule on this class of preferences satisﬁes strategy-proofness, unanimity,
symmetry, and nonbossiness if and only if it is the uniform rule.
We conclude by commenting on further research. The only if part of our The-
orem does not hold when we drop any of the three axioms of strategy-proofness,
22unanimity, and symmetry. The proportional rule19 satisﬁes unanimity, symmetry,
and nonbossiness, but not strategy-proofness. The queuing rules20 satisfy strategy-
proofness, unanimity, and nonbossiness, but not symmetry. The equal distribution
rule21 satisﬁes strategy-proofness, symmetry, and nonbossiness, but not unanimity.
Thus, it is an open question whether the uniqueness part of our theorem holds
without nonbossiness.
In the one-commodity case, since the uniform rule is nonbossy, strategy-proofness,
Pareto-eﬃciency, and symmetry imply nonbossiness (Sprumont, 1991; Ching, 1994).
Moreover, eﬀectively pairwise strategy-proofness and unanimity imply nonbossiness
(Serizawa, 2006).22 Therefore, it is an interesting question whether their charac-
terizations of the uniform rule for the one-commodity case extend to the multiple-
commodity case.
Appendix
Fact. For each   ∈ M, each xi
  ∈{ 0,W  }, each xi





− ,d) is nonempty.
Proof. Let   ∈ M, xi
  ∈{ 0,W  }, xi




  =0 .






j∈N p (Rj) if

j∈N p (Rj) > 0
W 
n otherwise.
20Queuing rule, Q: There is a permutation π of N, and for each R ∈R n and each   ∈ M,
Q
π(1)
  (R)=p (Rπ(1))
Q
π(2)





  (R) = min{p (Rπ(3)),W   − Q
π(1)



















22Eﬀective pairwise strategy-proofness requires that rules are strategy-proof and that no pair
of agents can increase the welfare of any agent of the pair without decreasing the welfare of
the other member of the pair, and neither member of the pair has an incentive to betray his





  ≡ max
ˆ y∈X

   =  (ˆ y   − xi
  )
2
d · (2 · ˆ y  + d)

. (13)
Since the set X is compact, Li
  exists. By d>0, 0 <L i
  < ∞. Let ai
  >L i
 . Let








   = 





Let Ri ⊂ X × X be the preference relation such that for each y,z ∈ X, yRiz if
and only if ui(y) ≥ ui(z). Then, p(Ri)=( 0 ,x i
− ), and Ri is continuous, strictly
convex, and separable. We show that for each y  ∈ [0,W   − d] and each y−  ∈ X− ,
(y ,y − ) P i (y  + d,xi
− ). Let y  ∈ [0,W   − d] and y−  ∈ X− . Then,
u
i (y ,y − ) − u
i 










   = 










  · d · (2 · y  + d) −


   = 







  · d · (2 · y  + d) −


   = 








 , d>0, and y  ≥ 0)






   =  (y   − xi
  )
2
d · (2 · y  + d)

≥0. (by (13), d>0, and y  ≥ 0)
Thus, Ri ∈R V(0,x i
− ,d).
Case 2: xi




  ≡ max
ˆ y∈[0,W −d]×X− 
 
   =  (ˆ y   − xi
  )
2
d · (2 · (W  − ˆ y ) − d)

.
Note that since the set [0,W   −d]×X−  is compact, ¯ Li
  exists. Since d>0 and for
each ˆ y  ∈ [0,W   − d], 2 · (W  − ˆ y ) − d>0, we have 0 < ¯ Li
  < ∞. Let ¯ ai
  > ¯ Li
 . Let
¯ ui : X → R be a utility function such that for each y ∈ X,
¯ u
i(y) ≡− ¯ a
i




   = 





Let ¯ Ri ⊂ X × X be the preference relation represented by ¯ ui. Similarly to Case 1,
we can show that ¯ Ri ∈R V(W ,x i
− ,d). 
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  (R) − p (R2)
•
Figure 1. Illustration of ( ˆ R1, ˆ R2) in the proof of Lemma 1.
commodity  
commodity   
W 
W  
0 y  y  + d
• p(Ri)
W  − d
d d d
ˆ y  ˆ y  + d
Ri
y−  •
(y ,y − )
•






(y  + d, p− (Ri)) (ˆ y  + d, p− (Ri))
Figure 2. Illustration of Ri ∈R V(0,x i
− ,d).
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fi( ¯ Ri,R −i)
fi( ˜ Ri,R −i)
(fi
 ( ¯ Ri,R −i)+d, p− ( ˜ Ri)) (0, ˜ xi
− )
p( ˜ Ri)
Figure 3. Illustration of Case 1-2 of Step 1 in the proof of Lemma 4.
commodity  










fi( ¯ Ri,R −i)
fi( ˜ Ri,R −i)
(fi




Figure 4. Illustration of Case 2-2 of Step 2 in the proof of Lemma 4.
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• p( ˜ Ri)
W  − d
d d
˜ Ri = ˜ R0 = ˜ Rj
•
•
• fi( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j)
fj( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j)
(fi
 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j)+d, p− ( ˜ Ri)) (0,x − )
Figure 5. Illustration of Case 1-2 of Step 1 in the proof of Lemma 5.
commodity  




• p( ˜ Ri)
d d
˜ Ri = ˜ R0 = ˜ Rj
•
• •fi( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j)





 ( ˜ Ri,j,R −i,j)+d, p− ( ˜ Ri))































3 ). Note that ¯ R(R1)= ¯ R(R2).
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0 , ¯ R− ¯ N)
fi( ˜ R
ˆ N




















0 , ¯ R− ¯ N)
fi( ˜ R
ˆ N










commodity   
Figure 9. Illustration of Case (b) of Step 1-2 in the proof of Lemma 7.
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Figure 10. Illustration of ¯ R in the proof of Step 2 (Lemma 7) and Theorem.
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